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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEMENT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and .A.ppella;nt,
'VS.

C. K. BOWERBANK,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This action involves the cost of a party wall. Plaintiff and defendant are the owners of adjoining business
property situate on Ogden Avenue, Ogden City, Utah.
Each contemplated the construction of a new building.
On the 11th day of December, 1945, and before any construction had commenced, the parties entered into a
written party wall agreement. It was mutually agreed
that plaintiff would construct, as a part of its building,
a party wall on the South, for their joint use. The
agreement provided that the wall should be constructed
in accordance with plans and specifications then being
prepared by the architect employed by the plaintiff and
that the boundary line as previously fixed by H. J.
Craven and Son, Civil Engineers, (who had previously
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

surveyed the property and had marked the boundary
line on the premises), should be established as the center
line of the wall.
The agreement further provided that as soon as
plaintiff's building was completed to a point where the
total cost was ascertainable, defendant would pay plaintiff.
"the full one-half of the total cost of said· wall
and one-half the cost of the survey."
The agreement is silent as to how this total cost was
to be ascertained.
On or about December 1, 1945, Art Shreeve, a licensed architect, (who died before the trial), prepared
general specifications for plaintiff's building, the South
wall of which was to be the party wall in question, and
invited bids for the construction of said building, in
accordance therewith. The specifications contained the
following provision;
"This contractor is to state in his bid a lump
sum amount for the construction of the South
wall. ' ' See page 20.
Three well-known and responsible contractors sub•
mitted bids to the architect: C. B. Lauch Construction
Company, Earl S. Paul, and Lawrence .Mayberry.
Lauch's bid was for Sixteen Thousand Dollars
($16,000.00) (Exhibit C), and it being the lowest bid,
the same was accepted by plaintiff on the advice of its
architect.
2
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On December 18, 1945, Lauch wrote the architect
as follows:
":Jir. Art Shreeve, Architect, Kiesel Building,
Ogden, Utah. December 17, 1945.
Dear Sir: 'Ve propose to construct a building
for the Sidney Stevens Implement Co. of Ogden,
U tab, as per your plans and specifications under
date of December lOth for the sum of $16,000.00.
Yours or Very truly yours, C. B. Lauch Construction Company by C. B. Lauch.''
On December 18, 1945, Lauch wrote the architect as
follows:
'• :Jir. Art Shreeve, Architect, Kiesel Building,
Ogden, Utah. In re Steven's Implement Building.
Dear Sir: In compliance with the last paragraph
on page 20 of the specifications for the above
building, we quote you for the South (party)
Wall, which includes the excavation, footings
with reinforcing steel, columns, and brick wall
all according to the plans and specifications, the
sum of $4435.00 Yours very truly, C. B. Lauch
Construction Company.'' (See Exhibit D)
On December 26th, 1945, there was attached to the
plans and specifications an addendum wherein certain
changes were made in the plans and specifications. (See
last sheet of plans and specifications, Exhibit B.)
The only change which in any way related to the
party wall was the following:
Masonry.
Page 19, Exterior Walls: Change to read as follows:
3
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"Balance of walls to he constructed of Lava Ash
Blocks, as manufactured by the Utah Concrete
Pipe Co., size 10 in. x 8 in. x 16 in.''
The original plans provided as follows:
''All exterior walls shall be 12 in. walls . . . exterior walls common brick." (See page 19, Exhibit B.)
To fully understand the effect of this change, it
should be noted that the plans call for the construction
of reinforced concrete pillars which supported steel
girders for the roof. The walls referred to above were
the filling between these pillars and carried no weight
from the roof.
On December 26th and after the addendum had been
attached, a written agreement for the construction of
plaintiff's building was entered into. (Exhibit G.) The
total amount was $15,377.00, making a reduction of
$623.00 from the original bid. Lauch gave plaintiff an
itemized statement in support of the reduction made
possible by the changes in the original plan. (Exhibit
P.) It showed a reduction in the cost of all the exterior
walls of $200.00. The other items related to changes
in the roof, the floor, and other parts of the building
and had nothing to do with this wall.
When the building had been completed beyond the
entire construction of the party wall, plaintiff billed
defendant for the sum of $2,217.50, plus $85.00 for a
chimney placed in t~e wall for the exclusive use of the
defendant. This chimney charge is not questioned and
will need no further reference.
4
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Defendant refused to pay the bill, contending the
same was excessive. Plaintiff filed this action to recover the above amount, with interest. Defendant answered, denying that the total cost to plaintiff of the
party wall exceeded $2,530.00. Defendant also filed a
counterclaim ag·ainst plaintiff. In this counterclaim defendant alleged that after the execution of the party
wall agreement defendant caused a survey to be made
by one \Villiam Stowe, a licensed surveyor, to ascertain
the true diYision line, and that it was ascertained by this
surveyor that the Craven survey did not designate the
true boundary line but that the same was 10% inches
North of the line fixed by Craven, and that upon being
so informed plaintiff and defendant, by mutual agreement (orally) established the line as fixed by Stowe and
agreed that the party wall should be constructed with
this line as the center of the wall. That the plaintiff
then proceeded with the construction of the wall and
after its completion defendant discovered that the wall
had been constructed on the Craven line and he prayed
for damages in the sum of $1000.00.
By its reply, plaintiff denied the existence of any
valid contract as alleged, and alleged laches and estoppal
as an affirmative defense to defendant's counterclaim.
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of
the case, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on defendant's counterclaim. ( Tr. 159-160) The motion
was denied, to which plaintiff reserved an exception.
Plaintiff also, by its requested instruction No. 3, requested the Court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of plaintiff as to defendant's counterclaim.
This request was refused and exception taken.
5
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The Court submitted the case to the jury on four
special interrogatories which were answered by the jury
as follows:
1. What was the cost of the party wall in question

to the

plaintiff~

Answer: $2750.00.
2. Did Frank J. Stevens, Jr., and Henry Stevens,
either or both of them, mutually agree with
the defendant as to where the division line of
their properties was to be located and establish the same based upon the William Stowe
survey~

Answer:

Yes.

3. Was the center of the party wall constructed
along the division line of the properties as
agreed upon?
Answer: No.
4. A. How far South of the agreed-upon division
line of the properties was center of the party
wall constructed~
Answer: 9.25 inches.
B. What was the reasonable market value in
the spring and early summer of 1946 of one
foot frontage of unimproved property located
on the East side of Ogden Avenue and approximately in the middle of the block between 25th
and 26th Street~
Answer : $196.50.
The Court received the answers, ordered the same filed,
and thereafter, on December 30, 1948, entered findings
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and judgment on the Yerdict, awarded plaintiff judgment for $1375.00 and interest, and awarded defendant
judgment for $151.42 and interest, and set-off this
amount against plaintiff's judgment, leaving a balance
due plaintiff of $1223.58 and interest from May 1, 1946.
On January 6, 1949, plaintiff served and filed a
motion for new trial. On January 26th, 1949, the Court
denied plaintiff's motion for the reason the same was
not filed in time. ( 041)
Plaintiff then moved the Court to file the motion
out of time under the provisions of
Section 104-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
(047)

and supported its motion by affidavit of counsel. (048)
On February 11, 1949, the Court denied this motion.
(052)
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment and counterclaim and also from the order striking plaintiff's motion
for new trial and from the order denying plaintiff relief if the motion was not filed in time.

STATEMENT OF EVIDE,NCE
At the outset, we might observe that the only ques,..
tion involved is
''What was the cost to plaintiff for the construction of the party wall~''

7
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and the other question resolves itself into a question of
law as to whether or not defendant is entitled to recover
on his counterclaim.
In summarizing the evidence we will attempt to
confine ourselves to these two propositions, there being
no dispute as to the other questions involved.
C. H. Stevens, President of the plaintiff corporation, was the only witness called on behalf of plaintiff
to establish a prima facie case. He identified, and the
Court received in evidence, plaintiff's exhibits A to D,
which were the party wall agreement, the plans and
specifications, the Lauch bid, and the bid or break-down
on the cost of the party wall. Exhibits E and F were
not received. The Court received Exhibit G, the agreement between Lauch and the plaintiff. The Court also
received Exhibits H, I and J, which showed partial con-·
struction estimates, certified by the architect, and paid
by plaintiff to Lauch. The wall was completed before
the :March payment of $8,712.50.
On cross-examination, it was disclosed that plaintiff
was still withholding some $1500.00 from Lauch for the
reason that the building had never been fully completed,
and that an action was pending wherein Lauch was attempting to recover this money. We make this observation at this point to clarify the reason why Hilton,
Lauch's foreman, appeared to be an adverse witness.
Lauch had left the state of U tab, and under date or
November 17, 1947, he wrote a letter to Mr. Powell,
attorney for defendant, in which he stated that the cost
estimate of the party wall was $3127.00. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit L.)
8
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By way of a defense, defendant produced as a witness Jack Hilton, who entered the employ of Lauch
as Superintendent in April, 1949, after the Stevens building was well on its way to compleiton. He pointed out
the change in the party wall from 12 inch brick to 10
inch Lava Ash blocks. Then the Court, over plaintiff's
objection, permitted him to give his opinion as to what
it cost Lauch to construct this party wall, to which was
added a profit of ten percent. (Tr. 32-34, Defendant's
Exhibit 1)

On cross examination, he admitted he had nothing
to do with the construction of the wall. (Tr. 34) He
estimated that the change from a 12 inch wall of brick
to a 10 inch cinder block wall reduced the total cost of
\ the entire building by at least $1200.00 and reduced the
cost of the South wall by at least $1000.00. Tr. 36-41)
He further admitted that the other changes in the plans
reduced the cost to Lauch, and when asked why, if
this were so, the contract was reduced by only $623.00,
and where the excess went, he replied:
''For the constructjon of the rest of the building,
the contractor's overhead and profit, which I
figure the contractor's profit is his own business.'' (Tr. 41-45)
He further admitted ~hat if ~the origmal bid was
$16,000.00 and the cost was reduced by more than the
reduction in the contract, that the difference must inevitably have gone into profit to Lauch and that he
did not know how much profit Lauch made on the contract. ( Tr. 42)
9
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Defendant then called other contractors. Fred Carr,
Jr., was permitted, over plaintiff's objection, to give an
opinion to the effect that the cost of construction of this
wall was $2348.87. (Tr. 57) Joseph M. Green, a subcontractor, was permitted, over plaintiff's objection,
to testify what Lauch paid him for putting up the blocks,
$926.00, although this did not include the upper portion
of the wall. (Tr. 84-85) He stated he did not know
what Lauch charged the plaintiff for this work. (Tr.
85)
Andrew Isaacson, a contractor, was also permitted,
over plaintiff's objection, to give an opinion as to the
cost of the party wall, which he estimated at about
$2500.00. (Tr. 89) He also admitted that if the
plans were changed and cheaper construction used, that
the profits to the contractor would be greater unless
the contract was reduced proportionately. (Tr. 95)
In the estimate furnished by Lauch himself to Mr.
Powell, (Plaintiff's Exhibit L), he listed the cost to
plaintiff of the blocks as $1365.00, whereas, according
to Green's testimony he paid Green $926.00. Tr. 103)
By way of rebuttal, plaintiff also offered expert
evidence, but in view of the jury's verdict it is unnecessary to review this evidence.
We shall reserve a review of the testimony in support of defendant's counterclaim and treat that separately in connection with other matters hereinafter referred to.

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATE~IENT

OF ERRORS UPON WHICH
THE APPELL~\.NT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL
OF THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM
1. The Court erred in striking plaintiff's motion
for a new trial on the alleged ground that the same was
not filed in time.
:2. The Court erred in not allowing plaintiff to file

its motion for a new trial out of time.
3. The Court erred in admitting in evidence the
opinion of the defendant's witnesses Jack Hilton, Fred
Carr, Jr., Joseph M. Green, and Andrew Isaacson as
to what it cost Lauch Construction Company to build
the party wall.
4. The Court erred in not instructing the jury as
a matter of law the plaintiff was entitled to recover
the amount prayed for.
5. The Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for
a directed verdict as to defendant's counterclaim.
6. The Court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 3.
7. The Court erred in giving the jury its second interrogatory.
8. The Court erred in giving its third interrogatory.
9. The Court erred in giving its fourth interrogatory,
Subdivisions A and B.

11
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10. The Court erred in entering its judgment on the
verdict awarding plaintiff only the sum of $1375.00 as
one-half the cost to the plaintiff of the party wall.
11. The Court erred in entering its judgment on the
verdict in favor of defendant on his counterclaim in the
sum of $151.42, and off-setting the same against plaintiff's judgment.
ARGUMENT
We will endeavor to discuss each of the statements
of error in the order above set out, grouping together
those assignments which may be conveniently discussed
together.
Point No.1
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE FOR A NEW.
TRIAL AND IN REFUSING TO HEAR OR CONSIDER SAID MOTION FOR THE REASON THAT
NO NOTICE OF THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WAS
EVER SERVED UPON PLAINTIFF OR I'l'S ATTORNEY.
The rules of practice adopted by the District Courts
of the Second District provide as follows:
''Rule 14.
Preparation of Findings, etc: When findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment or decree are required by statute to be in writing counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare them
and serve a copy upon counsel for the adverse
12
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party before deliYering- them to the Judge. AdYerse counsel's acknowledgment of receipt of
copies, or if he refuses to acknowledge receipt,
prevailing- counsel's certifieate of such service
shall be suffieient evidence of service. A certificate by counsel for the prevailing party of mailing· shall be sufficient where adverse counsel lives
in a city or town different from that of prevailing counsel.
''Rule 15.
Objection to Findings: On receipt by the
court of findings, conclusions and judgment or
decree in contested matters, served as required
by Rule 14, the same will be held by the court for
48 hours, during which time counsel must file
objections to the same. Provided, that the court
may, in his discretion, grant counsel additional
time in which to prepare, serve and file written
objections or amendments to the proposed findings, conclusions and judgments or decrees, and
may, in his discretion set time for arg-ument
thereon.
Rule 16.
Preparation of Orders: All orders desired or
required to be made in writing shall be prepared
by counsel for the moving party, unless the matter
is contested and gone to a final decision, in which
case they shall be prepared by counsel for the
prevailing party.
"Rule 17.
Notice by Clerk of Decision: When a decision
is rendered by the Court upon a matter under
advisement or in the absence of counsel, such
counsel as were absent shall be given, by the

13
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Clerk written notice of the decision my mail.
Such 'notices shall contain the name and number
of the case a statement of the decision such as
' demurrer overruled' or 'Judgment
'Defendant's
for plaintiff.'
''The presence of a member of a firm or one
of the associate counsel at the time of the rendition of the decision shall dispense with the
notice to them.
''Counsel in default or absent without cause
shall not be entitled to notice.
''Nothing herein contained shall affect or
relieve counsel of the necessity of giving such
notice to opposing counsel as the statute may require in the case either for starting time to run
or otherwise.''
Pursuant to the above rules and in accordance with
the practice which has prevailed for many years in this
district, counsel for plaintiff prepared proposed Findings and Judgment on the verdict of the jury and served
notice on counsel for defendant that he was presenting
the same to the Court as his proposed Findings and
Judgment. The record shows the service was .made on
the 24th day of December, 1948. The proposed Findings
and Judgment were then left with the Court, unsigned
and not filed. In accordance with the foregoing rules,
the attorney who prepares proposed Findings and Judgment has no control over the same thereafter. The
trial Court must wait 48 hours to give opposing counsel
an opportunity to file objections. If none are filed
the Court may accept the Findings and Judgment as
proposed or may make such changes as he may desire.
14
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There is no rule requiring the Court to sign the Findings and Judgment as proposed, nor is there any rule
requiring the Court to sign the same at the expiration
of the 48 hours or in any other time. The trial Judge
may and frequently does bold them on his desk for days
or weeks before actually signing the proposed Findings
and Judgment. The record here discloses that the proposed Findings and Judgment were not signed by the
Court until the 30th day of December, 1948. This rule
of practice discloses the reason for rule 17, which requires the Clerk to give written notice to the absent
counsel. No such notice was ever given, either in writing
or orally, by the Clerk to counsel for plaintiff and counsel
did not know that the Findings and Judgment bad been
signed until several days later. Immediately upon learning that the trial Court bad signed and filed the propuosed Findings and Judgment, with modifications and
changes as made by the Court, he immediately prepared,
served and filed plaintiff's notice of intention to move
for a new trial. This was filed on the 6th day of J anuary, 1949, only 7 days after the Court bad signed the
Findings and Judgment on the verdict, as modified by
him.
When the motion for a new trial came on to be
heard, counsel for respondent made oral objections
to arguing the motion, for the reason that notice of
motion was not filed within five ( 5) days after the entry
of the judgment. The Court relied upon the case of
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah 456,
154 Pacific 952,
construing
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Section 104-40-4, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943,
and thereupon struck plaintiff's motion and refused to
hear or decide the same.
We believe the Court was in error for two reasons.
First, we contend that the rule announced in Cody
vs. Cody does not apply where the rules of practice provide otherwise. If, as appears from the Cody case,
counsel presents to the Court Findings and Judgment
~ the Court immediately signs the same, then of course
we could see no reason why he should have notice of
the signing of the Findings, but where, as in our case,
counsel in whose favor the judgment is entered prepares proposed Findings and counsel on the other side
has 48 hours to propose amendments, and neither party
knows when the Findings and Judgment are actually
signed, then it does seem to us that counsel on both sides
are placed on an equal footing. Hence the adoption of
Rule 17 which requires the Clerk of the Court to give
written notice to absent eounsel.
If the rule announced in the Cody case is followed
under the rules of practice adopted by this district, the
counsel who prepares proposed Findings must, at his
peril, call the Court every day to find out if and when
the Findings and Judgment are actually signed. Such
a rule would place an unreasonable burden upon attor·
neys.
Second, we further contend that the Court erred in
striking plaintiff's motion for a new trial for the ad-
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ditional reason that no written motion to strike was ever
served or filed by opposing counsel. Rules and orders
made by the trial court, except as to admissibility of
evidence during the trial, must be raised by some form
of pleading or written motion, so that issues may be
made and Findings and Judgment entered thereon. Such
is and always has been the recognized procedural practice in the Courts of this state, both in the trial Courts
and in this Court. Motions to quash service of summons, to strike pleadings, to grant extensions of time,
to amend pleadings, to bring in new parties, to strike
bills of exceptions, dismiss actions, or dismiss appeals
all must be in writing and served upon adverse counsel
pursuant to
Section 104-42-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943.
Point No.2.
EVEN THOUGH THE MOTION WAS FILED OUT
OF TIME, YET THE COURT EJ:RRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF RELIEF UNDER SECTION 104-14-4.
When the trial Court struck plaintiff's motion for
a new trial, counsel immediately filed a written motion
for relief to file out of time. The motion was supported
by affidavit of counsel. At most, the ruling striking the
motion was purely technical. The motion for new trial
was actually filed within 7 days after the judgment was
entered. No prejudice was shown or even suggested. It
seems to us that the trial Court clearly abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's motion and in not per-
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mitting plaintiff to file the same out of time, in view of
the frequent pronouncements of this Court favoring the
disposal of matters on their merits rather than upon
mere technicalities. This Court has been very liberal
in permitting the setting aside of default judgments, as
well as in granting other relief out of time where the
parties have acted with dispatch and no prejudice has
resulted to the opposing party. We say, therefore, the
Court committed reversible error both in striking plaintiff's motion for a new trial and in any event in refusing
to grant the relief asked for under the provisions of
Section 104-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
Point No.3.
IN THE ABSENCE: OF A MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL THIS COURT MAY NEVERTHELESS REVIEW ON THIS APPEAL PRACTICALLY ALL THE
ERRORS RELIED UPON FOR A REVERSAL.
Should this Court sustain the rulings of the lower
Court striking plaintiff's motion for a new trial, yet
we contend that upon appeal this Court can review all
orders, rulings and decisions of the lower Court relied
upon for a reversal under the provisions of Section
104-41-5, as construed by the case of
Law vs. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac. 300.
Point No.4
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDE.NCE THE OPINION OF DEF.ENDANT'S WITNESSES HILTON, CARR, GREEN, AND ISAACSON,
AS TO THE AMOUNT IN THEIR OPINION IT
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WOULD COST LAUCH TO CONSTRUCT SAID
PARTY 'VALL AND IN PER~IITTING THE JURY
TO INFER OR DEDUCE THEREFROM WHAT
AMOUNT LAUCH CHARGED PLAINTIFF FOR
SAID CONSTRUCTION.
Assignment No. 3, 4 and 10 all relate to the foregoing proposition and can be discussed together.
When the parties entered into the party wall agreement, defendant knew and understood that plaintiff was
about to commence the erection of a building upon its
property and that plans and specifications were then
being prepared by its architect. (The agreement so
states.) No formula, however, was provided in the
agreement for determining the cost. All the agreement
provided was that when costs of the party wall were
ascertainable, the defendant would pay one-half the
cost thereof. The trial Court, correctly, we think, construed the agreement to mean that defendant agreed to
pay plaintiff one-half of the actual cost to it for this
wall. It was not a case of paying one-half the reasonable
value of the wall nor one-half the reasonable cost based
upon quantum meruit, but one-half the actual cost. If,
by chance, plaintiff was imposed upon and paid too
much for the wall, the defendant, by his contract, must
share equally in plaintiff's bad bargain. How, then,
was this cost to be determined 1 Clearly defendant knew
that plaintiff was not going to actually construct this
building. He also knew that the preparatory work was
then in the hands of an architect who was actually preparing the plans and specifications. Likewise the
architect knew of the existence of this party wall agree-
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ment. Certainly, as a prudent architect, he could not
submit to bidders separately a bid for the construction
of the wall and a separate bid for the construction of
the rest of the building. To have invited two separate
contractors to take the job, one to build the wall and
another to build the rest of the building, would not have
been prudent or in keeping with ordinary construction
procedure. We submit that the architect proceeded in a
proper manner in determining a basis upon which to
fix the cost of this wall. In his plans and specifications
he provided that anyone desiring to bid on this job
must separately state the cost of this party wall.
Three responsible bidders presented him bids.
Lauch's was the lowest, for a total of $16,000.00, and, in
accordance with the specifications, he estimated the cost
of the party wall at $4435.00. His bid, being approved
by the architect, was accepted by plaintiff.
It is our position that this acceptance fixed the cost
to plaintiff for the construction of this wall just at effectively as the bid of $16,000.00 fixed the cost for the
entire building. Had the question involved been the
cost of the entire building, no one could have questioned
that the cost to the owner would be the entire contract
price, and if that is so, then why is not a cost of a segment of a building arrived at in the same manner? A
purchaser might offer ten thousand dollars for a bunch
of cattle. In the bunch might be one particularly choice
animal, which he offered one thousand dollars as a part
of the total purchase price. Certainly the acceptance of
the bid for the entire herd would fix the cost of the one
animal just as effe·ctively as if he had purchased only
that one particular animal.
20
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Defendant seems to contend that he was in no way
concerned with the relationship which existed between
the builder, the architect, and the owner. We deny this.
We take the position that, under the terms of his contract, defendant was definitely tied into this relationship
because he in effect became a participant in the building
of this wall to the extent that he agreed to pay a sum
equal to one-half its actual cost to plaintiff. In the negotiations plaintiff had nothing whatever to do with
fixing this cost. We submit it proceeded in the usual
and customary manner. It first employed a competent,
experienced architect, whose honesty and qualifications
are not questioned. The responsibility then rested upon
the architect to draw plans, supervise the bids, supervise
the construction of the building, determine costs, and in
fact assume complete responsibility. Such are the duties
of an architect.
Defendant intimates all through this case that the
plaintiff had a motive in increasing the cost of the party
wall to its advantage, but to imply such a motive to plaintiff likewise impunes the motives, good faith, honesty
and integrity of both the architect and the contractor.
Certainly there is no evidence of such improper motives,
acts, or conduct by these parties.
This Court, of course, will not presume that these
parties acted dishonestly in fixing in advance an exorbitant or untruthful cost of the party wall. The honesty
and integrity of everyone is presumed until and unless
evidence to the contrary is presented. We say, therefore, that the method arrived at for determining the cost
of this party wall was arrived at in precisely the same
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manner as was the cost of the entire building, and when
accepted by the builder, it became the cost to him of
such wall. True after the bid was accepted there were
some modifications which reduced the bid by $623.00,
$200.00 of which should be applied in reduction of the
cost to plaintiff of the party wall. This matter will be
discussed in more detail hereafter.
If this Court concludes that we are in error in the
position taken, and if some other method for determining
costs is deemed the correct method, still the undisputed
evidence in this case shows that the party wall actually
cost the plaintiff more than the sum awarded by the jury,
and therefore the answer of the jury to the special interrogatory and the verdict of the Court entered thereon
can find no support in the evidence. The evidence shows
that Lauch bid the sum of $16,000.00 for the construction
of the entire building in accordance with the original
plans and specifications. However, before the contract
was signed, certain modifications were proposed and accepted. (See last sheet of Exhibit B) As a result, the
total cost was reduced by $623.00 and the written contract was then executed, which called for a payment of
$15,377.00. Only one of the changes in any way affected
the party wall. Instead of a twelve inch brick, a ten
inch lava block was substituted. According to Hilton,
defendant's witness, who was superintendent for Lauch,
this change effected a saving to Lauch of at least $1200.00
on the total building and a saving to him of at least
$1000.00 in the cost to Lauch for the construction of the
party wall. Yet in making the reduction in the contract
price, he reduced the same by only $200.00. (See plaintiff's Exhibit P.)
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It may be that the contractor thereby obtained an
advantag-eous barg·ain but again it must be remembered
that we are not concerned with what it cost Lauch to
build this wall. We are only concerned with what it cost
the plaintiff. If, therefore, Lauch effected a savings to
himself of $1200.00 by changing from brick to block, then,
unless he passed this saving to the owner by reducing
his bid proportionately, he thereby increased his profits
or his prospects of profits by that amount. This no
doubt is the explanation for his letter to ~ir. Powell.
(Exhibit L) This letter was written by Mr. Lauch to
Mr. Powell after a dispute arose between Lauch and
plaintiff growing out of the contract, which dispute,
however, had nothing to do with the party wall. In
that letter he listed the cost of the blocks to plaintiff at
$1365.00, notwithstanding Green testified that he, Lauch,
paid Green $960.00 for the material and labor in placing
these blocks in the wall, and we ·submit that plaintiff
did pay Lauch far more than the actual cost to Lauch
for the construction of this wall.

Defendant offered no evidence as to what Lauch
charged the plaintiff. Neither did he offer any evidence
as to the profit Lauch actually made. All that these
expert witnesses testified to was that in their opinion
Lauch could have built the wall for a certain amount
which was based upon their opinions as to the reasonable cost for the labor and material, to which was added
an arbitrary ten percent profit, but, as heretofore noted,
the cost to Lauch certainly is not the cost to the plaintiff,
nor is the assumed ten percent profit any proof of the
actual profit made by Lauch on this job.
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It is too well known to permit of serious argument
that during the period in question contractors were not
building buildings just for the experience. They were
out to make a profit, and during this period exborbitant
profits were made, as everyone well knows. ·
Had defendant offered evidence as to the proportionate cost which the party wall bore to the entire contract price, that is, say they bad offered evidence that
the wall in question constituted thirty percent of the
entire materials and labor supplied by Lauch in the entire building, there might have been some argument as
to its admissibility, but defendant did not choose to
offer that line of proof. He apparently relied on the
assumption that proof of the reasonable cost to Lauch
was proof of the cost to plaintiff, an assumption, we
submit, which can find no support in the evidence. We
submit, therefore, that the answer of the jury to the
special interrogatory, to the effect that the cost of the
party wall to the plaintiff was $2750.00 and the judgment entered by the Court based upon said answer find
no support in the evidence, but that the evidence conclusively shows that the party wall cost the plaintiff
$4435.00, less the $200.00 reduction made by the contractor, or in any event not less than the $3127.00 as
stated by Lauch in his letter of November 17, 1947.
Point No.5
T.HE COUHT EHRED IN DENYING PLAINTib,F'S
MOTION FOR A NON-SUIT AS TO DEFENDANT'S
COUNTER-CLAIM, IN DE.NYING PLAINTIFF'~
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT THEREON,
AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3.
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By his counterclaim, defendant sought damages
against plaintiff for breach of an alleged oral agTeement
to place the party wall at a point 10=Y-J, inches North of
the point where the wall was actually constructed. The
lower Court submitted this issue to the jury in its Interrogatory No. ±, Subdivisions A and B, and the jury,
by its answer, found that the division wall was placed
91A, inches South of the agreed upon division line and
assessed defendant's damages in the sum of $151.42. The
Court adopted theanswers of the jury and awarded defendant a judgment on his counter-claim in the sum of
$151.42, with accrued interest, and off-set the same
against the verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant obtained title to the property from two
sources, the first being a deed from F. J. Stevens Estate,
the owner of the property. The description used in this
deed starts from the Southeast corner of Lot 10 and this
is the description pleaded by defendant in his answer
and counterclaim. Defendant also obtained a deed from
Ogden City (owner of a tax title). This description
commences from the Northwest corner. By reason of
some excess in Block 17 there appears to be a difference
of about 101;4 inches, depending on which point of beginning is used by a surveyor.
Jack Ora ven was employed to make the survey. He
fixed the boundary line and marked the same upon the
premises. In doing this he used the description contained in the Stevens deed. The party wall provided
that
''The boundary line as heretofore fixed by said
surveyor (Craven) and marked upon the premises
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shall be considered the center line of said South
(party) wall, and that the same shall be constructed one-half thereof on each side of said line
so established as aforesaid.''
After this agreement had been executed, hut before
the contractor had started to construct said wall, defendant employed one Stowe, Ogden City Surveyor, to
resurvey his property. In doing so, he used the description contained in the tax deed, and from such description
concluded that the correct boundary line was about 10%
inches North of the line previously established by Craven. Over plaintiff's objection, defendant was permitted
to testify substantially as follows: That after the Stowe
survey had been made; he, in company with Stowe, went
to the office of plaintiff and talked with Henry (President) and Frank, Jr., (Secretary) relative to the difference between the two surveys. That Henry got out the
two descriptions and Stowe showed him where the difference was in the two surveys. (Tr. 105-107) That
then Frank, Jr., and defendant went to the property and
and that they told the foreman Richardson where to put
the wall, but that the wall was built on the line of the
Craven survey. He further testified that he was upon
the premises when the footings were laid and he watched
both buildings go up and was about the premises every
day. (Tr. 112) On cross-examination he testified that
he and ~-,rank, Jr., indicated the point where the wall
was to be constructed and that thereupon Lauch's foreman made a mark where the wall was to he placed. (Tr.
115) That the foreman was in charge of the work and
that defendant was there on the grounds when the forms
were put in and the wall constructed, and that he raised
no objection until after the wall was completed. (Tr.
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116) Stowe testified along the same line and on crossexamination stated that there would be only a diffen~nce
of -PI! inches between where Frank, Jr., and the defendant fixed the line and where the wall was constructed.
(Tr. 122)
We contend that this evidence was erroneously admitted and that the counterclaim was erroneously submitted to the jury for the following reasons:
1. STATUTE OF FRAUDS. The written party
wall agreement fixed and determined the true boundary
line between the properties, and provided that the center
line of the party wall was to be constructed on this line.
The effect of the alleged oral agreement was to transfer
or convey to the defendant a strip of land, 10% inches
wide, North of this line. We contend that such an oral
agreement is void and unenforcible under the provisions
of
Section 33-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943
rrhackery vs. Knight, 5'7 U tab, 21,
192 Pac. 263.
Bybee vs. Stuart, ________ Utah ________ ,
189 P. 2d 118
Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57,
276 Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417
11

c.

J.

s.

638

It is to be noted that it is not contended that either
party was in default as to the terms of the party wall
agreement at the time of the making of the alleged oral
agreement. Neither is it claimed that there was a part
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performance of the oral agreement so as to bring it within
the provisions of
Section 33-5-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
What defendant is seeking is the recovery of damages for failure to comply with the terms of an alleged
oral agreement, purely executory, to place the partition
line at a point 10%. inches North of the line established
by a written instrument.
2. NO SHOWING OF AGENCY. The second interrogatory propounded to the jury, to which plaintiff
took its exception, is confusing and the answer thereto
makes it impossible to determine what was the jury's
answer. The Court asked the jury specifically:

"Did Frank J. Stevens, Jr., and Henry Stevens,
either or both of them, mutually agree with the
defendant as to where the division line of their
properties was to be located and establish the
same based upon the William Stowe survey~"
The jury answered :
"Yes."
The Court asked three questions in one and the answer
could be ''Yes'' to any of the three questions, but
couldn't be a correct answer to all three. The jury may
have believed that Frank, Jr., and the defendant made
the agreement, and that is probably what the jury did
mean by its answer, because he admitted going upon
the premises with the defendant and agreeing upon a
certain line which he contended was midway between
the two lines, while Henry denied emphatically that he
was a party to any agreement of any kind or character.
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\Y e contend that, in the absence of evidence of such
authority, a Secretary and Treasurer of a corporation
has no authority to bind the corporation in relation to
the giving away of its real estate. What this purported
oral agreement amounted to was a giving up by the
corporation of its claim to lOY2 inches of the corporation's real estate. No attempt was made to show that
Frank, Jr., had any such authority to bind the plaintiff.

.·

-·

3. ESTOPPAL. The evidence shows, without dispute, that defendant and Frank, Jr., went upon the
land, established a point where the wall was to be constructed, and that the foreman then marked the same
upon the adjoining sidewalk. The contractor, Lauch,
was employed by both parties to construct buildings
simultaneously on each property, using the party wall as
a wall common to both buildings. If, as contended by
defendant, the contractor failed to place the wall where
they had both directed him to do so, and there is not
a scintilla of evidence that plaintiff had anything to do
with it, then the fault was the contractor's and not the
plaintiff's and he was as much the agent of defendant
as of plaintiff. The evidence further shows that the
defendant was in and about the premises every day,
that he was there when the forms were put up for
putting in the footings to the wall, and that he watched
the work progress from that point to completion, and
yet at no time did he make any complaint or assertion
that the wall was not placed at the point agreed upon
until after the wall was completed. Under such circumstances it seems to us that defendant ought, in equity,
to be estopped from now claiming damages as alleged
in his counterclaim.
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Point No.6
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY, AS THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, THE
VALUE OF HIS LAND PER FRONT FOOT.
If, as contended by defendant, the South wall of
plaintiff's building was placed 9.25 inches South of the
point where the parties orally agreed that it should
be placed, and if such agreement was binding, yet that
fact would not give plaintiff title to the 9.25 inches of
defendant's land for which plaintiff would be liable for
its fair cash market value. In the first place, but for
the written agreement fixing the boundary line, a most
interesting legal problem is presented which would probably require a decision of this Court to settle, and that
is, under the facts as disclosed where was the location
of the true boundary line between the properties¥ Defendant acquired title through two sources, one of which
was a deed from the previous owner. It is admitted
that if a surveyor followed the description in this deed,
the Craven survey is correct. The defendant also acquired a tax title from Ogden City. It is likewise admitted that if the surveyor followed the description con·
tained in this deed, the Stowe survey is correct. As a
legal proposition under such a state of facts, where is
the true boundary line f However, the parties, by the
terms of the party wall agreement, removed this uncertainty by establishing the line and there is no con·
tention of fraud or mutual mistake involved. If thereafter there was a valid, enforcible agreement entered
into between the parties that the wall should be constructed at the point designated by Stowe, and if there
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was a breach of that agreement, and the wall was placed
9.25 inches South of that line, what would be the measure
of damages 1 Certainly not the market value of the
land, because defendant has never conveyed or offered
to convey to plaintiff this strip of land. At most it
would be an enroachment upon the defendant's land to
the extent of this 9.25 inches, and, while defendant could
not compel a removal of the enroachment, yet the encroachment would continue only so long as the building
stood, or in other words the situation is similar to an
easement or right to encroach upon the defendant's land
during the life of the building. This is very different
from the obtaining of a fee to this property. The
measure of damages would be the difference between
the value of defendant's property before and the, value
of the property after the encroachment.

2 c. J.

s. 33.

However, there was no evidence upon which the
jury could base a verdict. Therefore the most the defendant would be entitled to recover would be nominal
damages, and it was error for the Court to sumbit to
the jury the fourth interrogatory and particularly Subdivision B thereof.
CONCLUSION
It is appellant's contention that the Court miscon-

ceived the issue with respect to the issues presented on
plaintiff's complaint by permitting evidence to be admitted to the jury as to what were reasonable costs to
Lauch in the construction of the party wall and thereby
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to penni t the jury to speculate or to erroneously deduce
therefrom what Lauch in turn charged the plaintiff for
th~ construction of this wall, and that such error was
prejudicial to the plaintiff and requires a reversal of
of this ease.
It is appellant's further contention that the Court
erroneously submitted to the jury the is-sues presented ·1
by defendant's counterclaim and that under the undisputed facts in this case, this Court should direct the
lower court to dismiss the counterclaim.

,

Respectfully submitted,
THATCHER & YOUNG,
Attorneys for AppeUant
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